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I.
STATEI\'IENT OF THE CASE

The Respondent, Commissioner on behalf of the Idaho State Tax Commission, entered a
ruling of a tax deficiency against the Appellants, James and Kaylynn Stivers, dated January 18,
2011 and ordered them to pay $16,915. The Stivers appealed the ruling to the Board of Tax
Appeals and offered the Commission a check of $500 and their only substantive asset, their
home, as surety for the 20% bond deposit required by Idaho Code 63-3049(b), and pursuant
thereof, which was rejected by the attorney for the Tax Commission, Phil N. Skinner (Record,
VoL I, pages 17, 56 and 58).
Consequently, the Board of Tax Appeals denied the Stivers their right to appeal for
failure to provide security as described by the Tax Commission Administrative and Enforcement
Rules rule 600 (IDAPA 35.02.01.600). Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

On July 18,2011, the Stivers filed a Complaint against the Idaho State Tax Commission
in Idaho District Court, Second Judicial District, as a court of original jurisdiction for citizens
with complaints against agencies of state government (R, Vol. I, page 6). The Court dismissed
the case in a final ruling on April 17, 2012, for lack ofjurisdiction due to the statutory limitations
imposed by LC. 63-3049(b) (R, Vol. I, page 83).
Pursuant of the Idaho Constitution Article V, Section 2 and Article V, Section 9,
Appellants now petition the Idaho Supreme Court to exercise the judicial power of the state and

either try the case as the only constitutional court of original jurisdiction over the subject matter,
or in the alternative, to issue a writ of mandamus to the district court to do so on its behalf.
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Procedural Background

On January 7, 2013, the above entitled appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals of the
State of Idaho for disposition and thereafter, this appeal was submitted for decision on the briefs
and without oral argument. On January 25, 2013, this Appellant, James W. Stivers, filed a
Motion to Revoke Order of Assignment, pursuant of Appellate Rules, 114 and Rule 108,
petitioning that the appeal be re-transferred to the Supreme Court for review and disposition
because
··(I) Appellants have invoked the original jurisdiction of the Idaho Supreme Court;
'"(2) Appellants believe their case involves 'substantial public interest';
""(3) Their case involves a question of substantial or federal constitutional interpretation;
and
"'(4) Their case raises a substantial question of law regarding the validity of a state
statute."

On February 15, 2013, an Order denying the motion was entered by the Clerk of the
Court, Stephen W. Kenyon. with a reference number 13-65.
The entitled appeal was subsequently reviewed and an opinion entered April 30, 2013 by
Judge Lansing, with Chief Judge Gutierrez and Judge Gratton concurring. in which the District

Court's dismissal was affirmed.
The Appellants' Petition for Rehearing with supporting brief was denied on June 6, 2013.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION DID NOT HA VE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY TO REFUSE THE STIVERS' OFFER OF A PROPERTY BOND
IN LIEU OF A CASH BOND

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY RECOGNIZE THE
CONDITIONS OF INDIGENCY OF THE STIVERS AND THUS ORDER THE
BOND BE WAIVED AND A NEW HEARING OR TRIAL BE SCHEDULED

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS BELIEVES INDIGENCY IS NOT A SUFFICIENT
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR WAIVING THE CASH BOND
REQUIREMENT AND THUS UPHELD THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DISMISSAL

APPELLANTS; SUPPORTING BRIEF FOR PETITION FOR REVIEW - 6

III.
COSTS

Other than court costs, the Stivers have not paid attorney's fees because they have

appeared pro se or in propria persona.
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IV.

ARGUl\<'.IENTS

Interpretative Analysis of the Court of Appeals' Opinion
The Court of Appeals has chosen to follow the path of the district court as an
administrative tribunal and not as a court fully endowed with the judicial power of the state:
"Because the Stivers did not provide the required security deposit, they were not entitled
to appeal the redetermination of their tax deficiency to the BTA. Accordingly, the order
dismissing the Stivers' petition for judicial review of the BTA decision is affirmed." (Opinion,
page 7).
Evidently, because the Stivers appealed to the BTA - believing that the courts require all
administrative appeals be exhausted before a case is "ripe" for judicial complaint

they forfeited

their right to a trial de nova in district court:
"Therefore, we treat their complaint filed in the district court as a petition for judicial
review of the BTA's order dismissing the Stivers' appeal." (Opinion, Footnote 2, pages 2-3)."
Otherwise, the Court believes the Stivers' Complaint would constitute a "collateral
attack" which is impermissible (Opinion, Footnote 4, page 4), "holding [a] taxpayer could not
collaterally attack constitutionality of tax obligations through independent tort action."
Thus, the Court does not distinguish the notion of collateral attacks from the attempt by
the Stivers to overcome the jurisdictional limitation imposed by statute and to appear before a
court with competent jurisdiction. The Stivers are seekingjudicial review but cannot obtain it
because of statutory and administrative deficiencies which restrict the lower courts. The Court
believes that remedies for such deficiencies are not the role of the judiciary - the only time when
the wisdom of the legislature is tested on a case-by-case basis

but rather expects that the

Stivers must spend their time and limited resources (now even further diminished by these
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alleged tax obligations) to organize a herculean effort for tax reform in the legislature. It must be
assumed, then, that the courts regard misdeeds on the part the Tax Commission as something
tolerable as Jong as 51 % of the electorate chooses to do nothing about it.
The Stivers have appealed to principles of justice as embodied in common law and the
respective constitutions under which we live. In contrast, this Court believes that expediency in
the collection of taxes supersede the question of"rights" and principles of justice:
''The Commission's decision to accept security that is "of a nature so reliable that
the government will be able to collect on it without delay and without competition from
other creditors" is certainly a legitimate governmental purpose and is rationally related to
the governmental objective of securing the payment of taxes." (Opinon, page 7)
Yet, the Tax Commission has not demonstrated reasoning why this must be so in this
case, and why the property bond would not secure the same objective. Rather, the Tax
Commission has relied upon the Court as its apologist that there is no "constitutional infirmity"
(Opinion, page 7).
The Court asserts that "'fees" are not distinguishable from "bonds," citing several cases in
which the waiving of court fees were denied to the indigent, and then applying those cases to
apply to the issue of bond requirements (Opinion, page 6). The Court does not consider that
there is a substantial difference between the two. "Fees'' are paid for services rendered, while
"bonds" are guarantees of fidelity. Bonds are not intended to preemptively punish the accused
(in criminal cases), nor are they intended to preemptively collect taxes that are presumptively
owed (tax cases being a branch of civil law).
The Court further asserts that the poor do not qualify as a protected class under the
Fourteenth Amendment. We might assume that to be true, if, as is commonly supposed, "poor"
means the inability to pay. The Stivers rely upon the Butcher's Decision (Appellants' Reply

Brief, pages 16 & 22) to define '"indigency" in its legal meaning as a person who labors in the
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common trades and who is not enriched by the labor of others. We have here, perhaps, the

foundation for a body of law protecting ·"workers' rights." Usually, workers do not have ready
access to cash from :financial institutions to satisfy the belligerent claims of a tax commission.
And in Idaho, a large class of unemployed workers has had to contrive various occupations of

self-employment to financially survive. This is the class of vulnerable workers which the Tax
Commission has targeted, while turning a blind eye toward the tax obligations of the
corporations which fired them (R, Vol. I, pages 50-63, 73; Appellants' Brief, page 6: Appellants'
Reply Brief, page 6). It can be demonstrated that they are a protected class under the Fourteenth
Amendment and one to which the Stivers belong. The Fourteenth Amendment was devised to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery and "involuntary servitude."
Certainly, these amendments directly affect the master-servant relationship and the condition of
workers.
The use of the credit system as a method to enforce debt peonage is an area of law worth
investigating. It can be used to control access to the courts in a manner which benefits certain
persons over others. The Appellants' various briefs and pleadings have demonstrated how this
might be so (e.g. Appellants' Brief, page 9, et al).
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Summary of Supporting Arguments

l ) The Court of Appeals did err in that it did not recognize the obligation of the district
court to inquire into its own jurisdiction, if it should find a statute with a constitutional or

administrative defect:
"The district court had inherent power to pass upon its o\\ln jurisdiction ... and such
necessarily entails the power to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes or court rules
purporting to limit that jurisdiction."
Skogerson v. La'wrence & McConnell (1983)
(Appellant's Reply Brief, page 13).
2) The Court of Appeals did err in that it did not recognize that the Idaho Supreme Court in

various decisions (e.g. Frizzell v. Swafford; Skogerson v. McConnell), and including the
Tarbox decision by tacit admission, provided for the condition of indigency as an
exception to the surety rule.
"Absent contention or showing that taxpayers were indigent or that they could not
have obtained bond money by procuring loan on equity in their home, district
court did not err in refusing to waive surety bond requirement and dismissing
appeal ... "
(R, Vol I, page 49)

'"Idaho code 19-2907 provides for the property bond and in Lori Skogerson v.
Lawrence and Jerry C. AcfcConnell (06/03/83), the Idaho Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Frizzell Decision and directed the district court 'to pass upon the
McConnells' claim of indigency and proceed in accordance with our opinion in
Frizzell v. Swafford,' the claim of whfoh was the basis of the McConneH motion
for an order waiving prepayment of fees, costs, and security." (R. Vol. I page 57)

3) The Court of Appeals did err in that it did not fault the Idaho State Tax Commission for

not providing an indigency test. The condition is implied by the "Other Security"
provision ofldaho Code 63-3049(b) and seems to reflect the intent of the legislature to

provide criteria which meets the financial condition of the taxpayer. It is incorporated in
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Rule 600.02 but the section lacks content and is left to the arbitrary and perhaps
capricious discretion of the Commission:

"Other security may be accepted by the Tax Commission to secure a taxpayer's
right of appeal if the Tax Commission has previously agreed in writing to accept
the other security in lieu of a cash payment." (R, Vol. I, page 34 & 57).
It seems contradictory that in the same sentence in which a reference is made to
the '"taxpayer's right of appeal" - describing the purpose of this rule as to "secure" that
right - when it is entirely left to the discretion of the Tax Commission whether to accept
that "other security" or not. [t is not a "right" at all, and certainly it is not ··secure" when
the Tax Commission cannot provide a list of such "other security," nor even a policy
statement or memo which would contain criteria from which a taxpayer may endeavor to
find an acceptable "security." As interpreted, this section of the law seems
unconstitutionally vague.

4) Lacking such a test, the Court of Appeals did err in disregarding the Stivers' effort to
offer two possible criteria to describe their own condition: first, the inability to pay
(having failed to obtain a home equity loan from three financial institutions) (R., Vol. I
page 9 & 56); and second, the U.S. Supreme Court's definition in the Butcher's Decision,
in which the "'poor man" is one without patrimony, who works in the common trades and
obtains no income from the labor of others (Appellants' Reply Brief, page 14). Thus, the
Stivers, while they do have assets such as an equitable interest in their home, they were
indigent because they could not borrow against it and provide a cash bond required by the
Tax Commission.
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5) Without an indigency test which allows for conditions of insolvency, the Appellants have
argued that the State Tax Commission, the district court, and the Court of Appeals have

unjustly divided the citizens ofldaho into two classes: one which is allowed access to the
courts because they have assets denominated in the nation's currency, and the other

which is not allowed to have access to the courts because they do not have assets
denominated in the nation's currency. This is contrary to the Idaho Constitution Article I,
Section 18 which requires free and speedy justice "without sale, denial. delay, or
prejudice." (R, Vol. I, page 9). It is also contrary to the First Amendment rights of free
speech (i.e. the right to speak to a judge to obtain justice being, perhaps, the most
important exercise of free speech), "the First Amendment Record Review Doctrine"
(Appellants' Reply Brief, page 11-12) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment which is intended to prevent a class system in American law.
6) The Court of Appeals did not rebuke and otherwise left standing the unqualified assertion
of the Attorney General that the State Tax Commission's activities are generally not
subject to judicial review (citing Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 84), thus seeming to
create a supra-constitutional agency which is above the law (R Vol. I, page 27).
7) The Court of Appeals treats bonds the same as fees (as argued above).
8) The Court of Appeals did err for not questioning the Tax Commission for introducing an
element of absurdity in its factual claims, in that the Commission does not believe there is
any statute of limitations upon the collection of taxes whether a citizen is required to file
a tax return or not (R, Vol. I, page 13). Infinite power is not what constitutional
republics are about. The Appellants' have argued there is a limitation established in the
common law under the doctrine of"equity of recoupment" (R, Vol. I, page 53, 65). The
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statute cited by the Commission is misread to prejudice against citizens who are not

required to file tax returns.
9) The Court of Appeals has erred in the belief that the action of the Stivers represents a
petition of administrative review only and one to which they are not entitled to as a
matter of right. The Stivers have petitioned for a common law remedy in the alternative,
namely, a

\\Tit

of mandamus ordering the Tax Commission to accept the Stivers' offer of

a property bond in lieu of a cash bond, believing that only the Supreme Court has
competent and original jurisdiction to exercise the judicial power of the state (R, Vol. I,
page 10).
10) An administrative review is not adequate due process. A republican form of government
requires access and representation in all branches of government. The State Tax
Commission and the Board of Tax Appeals are presumably either divisions of the
executive branch or creatures of the legislature. Due process requires the opportunity of
at least one pleading in a court exercising the judicial power of the state.
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CONCLUSION

This case is not about the legitimacy of the state income tax. It is not about the right of
the Tax Commission to collect taxes. This case is about the right of the citizen to his day in
court. It is about whether it is just for state government to force its citizens into debt peonage to
private lenders who hold the keys of access to justice. It is about discrimination between persons
who have different kinds of property: property controlled by banks as opposed to property owned
and controlled by the people. It is about the value of the land which constitutes the state of Idaho.
The petitioners request their day in court to argue the merits of the case and the relief
requested in their Complaint (R, Vol. I, page 10) - to vindicate the rights of an taxpayers who
share a common condition of financial distress - or to a remedy which the Court shall deem just.

Respectfully submitted this 11 th day of July, 2013

James W. Stivers, Pro Se

Kaylynn A. Stivers, Pro Se
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Certificate of Service by Mail
I, James Stivers, certify that on this 11_ day of July, 2013, I served two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANTS' SUPPORTING BRIEF FOR PETITION FOR REVIEW by sending the same
by certified mail with proof herein attached to:
Phil N. Skinner
Deputy Attorney General
POBox36
Boise, ID 83722
Attorney for the Idaho State Tax Commission

James Stivers, Appellant
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